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Legislative Redistricting 
ANDREW  GELMAN  and  GARY  KING* 
We analyze the effects of  redistricting as revealed in the votes received by the Democratic and Republican candidates for state 
legislature. We  develop measures of  partisan bias and the responsiveness of  the composition  of  the legislature to changes in 
statewide votes.  Our statistical  model  incorporates  a mixed  hierarchical  Bayesian  and non-Bayesian  estimation, requiring 
simulation along the lines of Tanner and Wong (1987). This model provides reliable estimates of partisan bias and responsiveness 
along with measures of  their variabilities from only a single year of  electoral data. This allows one to distinguish systematic 
changes in the underlying electoral system from typical election-to-election variability. 
KEY WORDS: Bayesian estimation; Elections; Political science; Random effects; Simulation. 
State and national legislators in the United States are 
largely elected by  plurality vote in individual geographic 
districts,  whose  boundaries  are redrawn  after every de- 
cennial census. In addition to ensuring equal populations 
in each district, redistricting affects which candidates are 
elected, the relative strengths of  the two parties in a leg- 
islative house, and other features of  the electoral system 
in a state. 
Partisans on both sides generally expend considerable 
political  and financial resources trying to control the re- 
districting process. Because redistricting affects not only 
immediate political  outcomes, but  also the fundamental 
rules of the game, it has always been a highly controversial 
partisan issue (Cain 1984). When partisans do not receive 
satisfaction in the legislative  arena, they often take their 
case to the courts. After decades of  these cases, the Su- 
preme Court finally declared political gerrymandering jus- 
tifiable (Davis v. Bandemer 1986). The court has not yet 
settled, however, on an acceptable standard for or mea- 
sure of  an unfair redistricting plan. 
In this article, we analyze the effects of  redistricting as 
revealed in the votes received by the Democrats and Re- 
publicans in  elections for state legislative  seats. We also 
develop measures of  partisan bias and the responsiveness 
of  the partisan composition of  the legislature to changes 
in  statewide votes.  Our conclusions depend on the ob- 
served distribution of votes across the legislative districts, 
as affected by redistricting, and on assumptions about how 
these  district-level  votes  change  as  the  statewide  vote 
changes.  We  also  explicitly  model  uncontested  district 
elections. 
Related quantitative issues that we do not directly dis- 
cuss here, but that could be studied with our model, in- 
clude  trends in  "marginal  seats,"  the importance of  in- 
cumbency, the effectiveness of racial gerrymandering, the 
effect of redistricting on individual districts, and the recent 
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declining responsiveness of the U.S. House of Represen- 
tatives to vote swings (Gelman and King, in press; King 
and Gelman, in press). 
Our statistical methodology involves a hierarchical ran- 
dom-effects model with a mixture of  Bayesian and non- 
Bayesian  estimation,  summarized probabilistically.  Our 
Bayesian computation requires simulation along the lines 
of  Tanner and Wong (1987). 
2.  THE  DATA 
We analyze the votes received by Democratic and Re- 
publican candidates for the lower house of the legislatures 
of  Ohio, Connecticut, and Wisconsin, in the seven elec- 
tions held in even-numbered years from 1968 through 1980. 
All elections in these states were by plurality vote in single- 
member districts, and, except for two districts in Wisconsin 
in 1980, were won by one of  the two major-party candi- 
dates. As a result of redistricting in the 1960s, all districts 
had roughly equal populations. As a sample of  our data, 
Table 1 shows votes in  each district election in  Ohio in 
1972 and 1974. (Our data are available from the Inter- 
university Consortium for Political and Social Research.) 
The Democrats controlled the 1971 Ohio redistricting 
process and redrew the 99 districts. Connecticut had 177 
districts in  1968-1970;  during the 1971 redistricting,  the 
number of  districts was reduced to 151 and the Republi- 
cans controlled where the lines were drawn. Wisconsin's 
100 districts were redrawn  in  1971 by  bipartisan  agree- 
ment. 
For convenience, we will henceforth refer to the Dem- 
ocratic proportion of the two-party vote for a given district 
election as the district vote. We label the average of  these 
proportions, over all districts in a given state and election, 
as the average district vote. 
Some district elections feature a single candidate with 
insignificant  opposition or none at all. We refer to such 
an election as uncontested if  one candidate gets more than 
95% of the two-party vote. The proportion of uncontested 
elections among all of  the district elections varies greatly 
over the three  states and seven  election years, with  an 
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Table 7. Votes Received by Democrats and Republicans in Ohio Legislative House Districts, 1972 and 7974 
- -----  --  - 
7972  7974 
Dlstrict  Democrat  Republican  District  Democrat  Republican  Distr~ct  Democrat  Republican  Distnct  Democrat  Republican 
average of  10% of  the seats uncontested in any election. 
No statewide election in our study had more than 23% 
uncontested seats, except for Wisconsin in 1980, with 32%. 
Election returns in uncontested districts do not adequately 
reflect support for the two political parties. Since we are 
interested in  this party  support, we define the effective 
vote in the case of  uncontested districts to be the (unob- 
served) proportion of  the two-party vote that this candi- 
date would have won in his or her district had the election 
been contested. We approximate the probability density 
of the effective vote with a stem-and-leaf plot of the vote 
proportions received by a party in a contested district, one 
election before an uncontested win by  that party in that 
district. Figure 1 presents this plot, based on data from 
Figure  7. Stem-and-Leaf Plot of the Proportion of the Vote Received 
by a Party in a Contested District Election, Immediately Preceding an 
Election in Which That Party Was Unopposed in That District. 276  Journal of  the American Statistical Association, June 1990 
1968-1980 in the three state legislatures considered in this 
article. 
3.  DATA  SUMMARIES  AND  EXPLORATION 
Previous work in this field has involved various theo- 
retical  constructs  and  related  data summaries,  but  ex- 
tremely few statistical models. One early concept is  the 
"swing ratioH-the  change in the proportion of  legislative 
seats won  by  a party  (S), divided by  the change in  the 
average district vote (V) received (Ansolabehere, Brady, 
and Fiorina 1988; Kendall and Stuart 1950). This concept 
was  expanded to the "seats-votes  curve,"  which  is  the 
fraction of the legislative seats won by a party, as a function 
of the average district vote (Niemi and Fett 1986; Quandt 
1974). This curve can be expressed as the function S(V), 
where the variables for fraction of  seats won and average 
district vote each vary from 0 to 1. Figure 2 presents two 
examples of seats-votes  curves. One reflects de facto state- 
wide proportional representation, where S = V. The other 
represents a highly responsive  electoral system near the 
middle of  the votes scale, where most elections are usually 
decided. Following  King and Browning (1987) and King 
(1989), we consider these two symmetric seats-votes  curves 
to represent electoral systems that are fair to the political 
parties. Deviation from bipartisan symmetry is considered 
partisan bias. 
Of course, a party's  legislative  representation  is  not  a 
function only of  the number of  votes it receives; a deter- 
ministic  seats-votes  curve, as  defined,  cannot  be  more 
than a theoretical construct (Tufte 1973). For this reason, 
we define the seats-votes  curve in real electoral systems 
to be the expected value of  S, as a function of  V,  and we 
will be interested in both this conditional expectation func- 
tion and variability around it. Responsiveness and bias can 
be defined more formally as follows: 
- [1 - E(S I 1 - V)].  (1) 
Past  researchers  have empirically  estimated  bias  and 
responsiveness in two ways. The most widely used method 
uses the statewide Democratic fraction of  seats won and 
the average statewide district vote for a legislature for each 
of  several consecutive  elections.  One can  estimate  the 
seats-votes  curve  by  fitting a  nonlinear  regression  to a 
scatterplot  of  these values,  and one can  calculate  sum- 
maries of  interest from this estimated curve. This method 
has  the  disadvantage of  ignoring  short-term  systematic 
changes in the underlying electoral system, as might result 
from redistricting.  Since only five elections are generally 
held between redistricting processes, this method is quite 
limited for present purposes. 
The second method, dating back to Butler (1951) [see 
also Gudgin and Taylor (1979)], creates a "hypothetical" 
seats-votes  curve from the district votes of  a single state- 
wide election. This curve plots S(V), under the assump- 
tion of  "uniform partisan swing"; that is, as the statewide 
vote V changes, the vote proportion in each district changes 
Figure 2. Example of Seats-Votes  Curves. 
by  the same amount. This method breaks down with dis- 
trict votes near 0 or 1  and, in general, is based on an overly 
strict assumption about voting patterns. 
Before describing our stochastic model, we give some 
exploratory data summaries. We are interested in the dis- 
tribution of  district vote across a state. Figure 3 shows a 
stem-and-leaf  plot  of  the district votes for the contested 
elections in Ohio in 1972. This pattern of two main humps 
with irregular outliers is typical of  recent U.S. legislative 
elections. We identify the two humps with Democratic and 
Republican "safe seats," and we identify the irregular pat- 
tern with the irregular influences of geography on election 
districts  and  individual  candidates  on  election  results. 
Sometimes such a plot for an election shows only one main 
hump in  the middle;  this  corresponds to a competitive 
system with few safe seats. 
Figure 3. Stem-and-Leaf Plot of  the Democratic  Proportion of  the 
Two-Party Vote in Contested District Elections in Ohio, 1972. Gelman and King: Estimating the Electoral Consequences of  Legislative Redistricting  277 
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Figure 4. Electoral Swing in Contested Districts, Ohio State House, 
1972-1974. 
Finally, we would like to know how much partisan vot- 
ing patterns persist from election to election. As an ex- 
ample of this, Figure 4 shows a scatterplot of district vote 
proportions for contested elections in  Ohio in  1972 and 
1974. (Each point on the plot represents one district.) Note 
that district votes clearly do not move exactly according 
to "uniform  partisan  swing";  if  they did, all the points 
would fall precisely on a single line with slope 1. Instead, 
the points in Figure 4 are scattered around a straight line 
with  slope  1 and intercept equal to the statewide  vote 
swing. We interpret the residual standard deviation in this 
figure  to be  within-district  random  variation  about the 
statewide average vote swing. (A nonuniform shift would 
be apparent if  the points in Fig. 4 fit a clearly nonlinear 
pattern or no pattern at all.) 
4.  A  PROBABILISTIC  MODEL 
To avoid problems with vote proportions near 0 or 1, 
we work with the logit of district votes in contested elec- 
tions. We label v,, as the Democratic vote in district i and 
election t, and u,, = logit(v,,) = ln[v,,/(l - v,,)] for con- 
tested elections. (For uncontested elections, u,, is the logit 
of the unobserved effective Democratic vote. This will be 
dealt with in Sec. 5.1.) 
Our linear model, fit to a single state, is 
where yi is a district effect, 6, is a statewide election effect, 
and the Normal distributions are independent. 
We assume, therefore, that vote swings about the state- 
wide mean are spatially independent across districts. More 
information about individual districts might enable one to 
better  characterize  district-level  vote  swings.  Unfortu- 
nately, these data have not been collected, and it would 
be quite difficult to do so. Modeling districts with  addi- 
tional information such as spatial correlation or covariates, 
if  they were available, would probably yield more accurate 
estimates of  the seats-votes  curve. Omitting this unavail- 
able information is unlikely to systematically bias our re- 
sults. 
From the logit effective vote proportions u, = (u,,, . . . , 
u,,,) for an election t, we define the aggregate Democratic 
proportions of  votes and seats: 
We  consider the vector  y  =  (y,, . . . ,y,,), along with 
the variance a', to identify an "electoral system." We will 
summarize this system by  the seats-votes  curve E(S, 1  V,, 
y), its variance var(S,  1  V,, y), and functions of  these such 
as the bias  and responsiveness functions. Since the ele- 
ments of  y  remain unknown, we model them as random 
effects by  letting the y,'s  be distributed  as a three-point 
Normal-mixture distribution with a prior distribution, all 
described in  Section 5.2. We  then average over our un- 
certainty in  y  as represented by  this distribution. 
The foregoing  model  is  applied  to a  single  observed 
statewide election, labeled t = 0, with observations u,,, (i 
= 1, . . . ,  n) and the assignment 6,) = 0. This assignment 
is arbitrary and does not affect our estimates of the seats- 
votes curve. If  an arbitrary constant were added to each 
effective district vote u,,, our results would not change. A 
family of  "hypothetical  election"  results u, is defined by 
the linear model, applied to a range of statewide vote shifts 
6,. This assumption that most electoral districts respond 
approximately  as the statewide  total  does is  widely  ac- 
cepted in the political science literature (Butler 1951; Niemi 
and Fett 1986), although it has not been formalized sta- 
tistically. Our data, such as those in Figure 4, are consistent 
with this pattern. This is also consistent with our assump- 
tion in Equation (2) of  no interaction between  y, and 6,. 
We apply this model to our data in four steps. 
1. Preliminary Estimation.  With data from several con- 
secutive  elections, we  estimate the global parameters of 
the model. These include a' and uncontested effective vote 
parameters p,,, and a,,,, described in Section 5. 
2. Bayesian Estimation for a Single Election.  We con- 
dition on the data u,, = (u,,,;  i = I, . . . , n) from a single 
election to sample from the posterior  distribution P(y  I 
u,,) of  the vector  y.  This  Bayesian  estimation  uses  the 
parameters determined in the previous step. 
3.  The Seats-Votes  Curve.  We average over P(y  1  u,) 
to estimate the posterior seats-votes  curve: 
(We allow V,  to range from 0 to 1 by allowing 6, to range 
from -  =  to =  on the logit scale.) We estimate the expected 
variance of  results across hypothetical elections: 278  Journal of the American Statistical Association, June 1990 
We also estimate uncertainty in the seats-votes  curve due 
to our uncertainty in y: 
4.  Summaries.  From the estimated seats-votes  curve 
(4) and related conditional expectations, we estimate bias 
and responsiveness summaries of  the definitons in (1): 
(average bias between V = .45 and V = .55) 
1  .55  -  - 
55 - .45 
(E(S  I  V) - [I - E(S 11 - V)]) dV 
(average responsiveness between V = .45 and V = .55) 
We define these summaries from V =  .45 to V =  3. 
This is  a convenient range, symmetric about  .5, within 
which most statewide votes fall. We calculate the posterior 
mean and variance of  these summaries. 
5.  ESTIMATION  OF  HYPERPARAMETERS 
5.1  Election-to-Election  Variability 
Our linear model creates hypothetical district election 
results uit from the district effects y; by  adding a constant 
shift 6, to the mean in every district. From here, we  add 
the variability in  (2); this "unexplained"  variance a2  de- 
termines the scope of  the electoral system identified with 
the family of  hypothetical elections. Setting a2  = 0, for 
example, causes the district effects to be exactly identified: 
yi = ulo.  This assumption of  "uniform  partisan swing" on 
the logit scale cannot hope to fit more than a single state- 
wide election. 
We estimate a2  from a model of  the variances in  real 
district-level election results, across time. We use the fol- 
lowing conceptual model: 
(variance between two elections, Y years apart) 
= (variance due to randomness in individual 
elections)  + (variance due to changes in the 
underlying electoral system). 
In this framework, the first term on the right side of  this 
equality is 2a2;  we imagine the second quantity to be roughly 
proportional  to  Y.  Note  that, from  (2),  the  difference 
u,,  -  uit2  has variance 2a2  if  their two Normal distributions 
are independent. 
For each state, we calculate the sample variance of  the 
We  then  fit  a  linear  regression  of  the values  sf,,,  as  a 
function of  the time differences (t2 - tl). For each state, 
our estimate of  2a2  is just  the estimate of  the constant 
term in this regression, and with an estimate of the regres- 
sion slope pooled across the three states. This yields es- 
timates of  a (on the logit scale) as .22, .19, and .22 for 
Ohio, Connecticut, and Wisconsin, respectively, each with 
a standard error of  estimation of  .02. 
5.2  The  Distribution of District Effects y, 
We need to estimate the vector y of district effects and 
our uncertainty in it. Embedding y in a lower-dimensional 
probabilistic model allows us to estimate these n district 
effects from the n data points uio;  we can also then con- 
veniently summarize our results in a posterior distribution. 
We consider the district effects to be drawn from a mix- 
ture of  three Normal distributions, identified by an eight- 
dimensional parameter 0 = (pi, p:  - a2,  A,;  j = 1, 2, 3) 
of  means, variances, and mixture proportions, with  the 
constraint A, + E.,  + A, = 1.  These three humps are meant 
to fit plots like Figure 3, with areas of Democratic strength, 
areas of  Republican strength, and some districts that fit 
no clear pattern. The parameter p:  is the variance of  the 
jth Normal distribution in the density of observed district 
vote proportions uio;  (p!  - a2)  is the variance of  the jth 
Normal distribution in the density of  expectations yi. 
The method of  maximum  likelihood  is inadequate to 
estimate these eight parameters, since the likelihood func- 
tion is unbounded. Therefore, we give the eight param- 
eters a prior distribution and move to Bayesian estimation. 
It is mathematically convenient,  and substantively  suffi- 
cient, to choose a family conjugate to an N(y,, a2)  distri- 
bution: 
-  (P  1,  j = 1, 2, 3 
(I,,, ,I2, A,) -  Dirichlet(a,,, a~,,  a;.,).  (8) 
Table 2 specifies these distributions; we have chosen these 
hyperparameters based on our substantive knowledge, and 
from inspection  of  stem-and-leaf  plots like Figure 3 and 
for many statewide elections (King and Gelman in press). 
When possible,  we  approximate to make prior  assump- 
tions about 0 vague rather than  overly restrictive.  Note 
that the prior distribution for y, is symmetric about 0, hence 
treating the political parties equally. We allow the param- 
eters y  and 6'  to change each election year. 
Finally, we truncate this distribution so that (p:  - a2) 
r  0 for j = 1, 2, 3. 
change in district vote between election years tl and t2,  for  Table 2.  Specified Hyperparameter  Values for the Prior 
districts contested in both elections:  Distribution on Q 
1 
~!,t,  = -  2   it, - uit, - (Et, - Et2)I2>  Parameter  j=  1  j=2  j=3 
t  i 
&I  -  .4  .4  0 
where n,,,,  is the number of  districts in the state contested  ON  .4  .4  3 
in both elections tl and t2. We calculate this quantity for  4  4  4 
all election years (tl, t2), tl < tZ,  between 1972 and 1980;  BPI  .16  .16  .64 
a ,,  19  19  4  that is, we do not track district votes across redistricting. Gelman and King: Estimating the Electoral Consequences of Legislative Redistricting 
5.3  Uncontested Elections 
For an uncontested Democratic district election, we ap- 
proximate the uncertainty in the effective vote by  the in- 
formation in the stem-and-leaf plot of  Figure 1. We then 
fit this to a Normal density on the logit scale: that is, for 
each uncontested seat i, 
Our data yield the estimates (Pun,  6,,)  = (.74, -57). As- 
suming this distribution to be independent of  uit  in Equa- 
tion (2), we get another Normal distribution for the un- 
contested district effects: 
where at, > 02.  We then truncate this distribution to be 
all-positive, so that an uncontested seat will always favor 
the winning party. We also symmetrically define y, for a 
Republican  uncontested  district  to  be  distributed  as 
N( -pun,  at, -  a'),  truncated to be negative. (Recall that 
0 on the logit scale is .5 on the votes scale.) 
6.  BAYESIAN  ESTIMATION  FOR  A 
SINGLE  ELECTION 
We summarize posterior distributions by sampling from, 
in the following order: 
Together, these steps amount to sampling from the desired 
posterior distribution of  election results. (All of these dis- 
tributions  are of  course  conditional  on  the  parameters 
specified in Sec. 5.) 
6.1  Averaging Over Uncertainty in 8 
The likelihood  function  P(uo  1  0) is the product  of  n 
independent densities: u,, -  Normal-mixture(,u,,  p:, I.,; j 
= 1,  2, 3). The posterior density P(8  /  u,,) is cumbersome, 
because  of  the Normal-mixture terms in  the likelihood. 
Direct sampling or numerical integration over this eight- 
dimensional distribution seems impossible. With a Normal 
likelihood, however, simulation of  O would be easy. We 
exploit this possibility through the data augmentation al- 
gorithm of  Tanner and Wong (1987). 
First, we decompose the Normal mixture through a ma- 
trix of unobserved indicator variables s = (s,,;  i = 1, . . .  , 
n;  j  = 1,2,3).  The likelihood P(p,,  /  8)  can then be factored 
into independent multinomial  distributions for the indi- 
cators (T,~,  s,,, s,,  I  8) -  multinomial(2,, I",, 23;  I), for i 
-  - 1, . . . , n, and a Normal  distribution for  the data, 
conditional on the indicators (u,,  /  s,,  =  1, 8) -  N(,u,, 
4). 
Next, we sample from P(8  /  u,),  in two steps, using the 
intermediate variable s. 
1. Sample from P(s  1  u,,) 
2. Sample from P(O  /  s, uo) 
Step 2, using Bayes's theorem with our conjugate prior 
distributions (8), is straightforward: 
(p,'  1  s, u,) -  W(ffp,  + n,), lVp,  + SS,)), 
j  = 1, 2, 3, 
(P,  1  pf, 7, 4 -  NPI;, PI;),  j  = 1, 2, 3, 
and 
(Ib1,  i.z, i.,  1  s, u,) -  Dirichlet(a,,  + n,; j  = 1,  2, 3), 
where 
a:,n,u,  + P,2P,, 
n,=Cs,,,  PI;= 
1  ot,n, + p:  ' 
In addition, the values pi are constrained to be no less 
than a2.  If  we simulate too low a value for a p,, we just 
keep repeating  the simulation of  0 until  we  satisfy  the 
constraint. 
Step 1 is  intractable  as stated but would be easy  if  8 
were known, because 
fori = 1,.  . . ,n, 
where 
and  4  is  the standard Normal  density  function.  In  our 
application of  the data augmentation algorithm, we sim- 
ulate a single random sample O* from P(8  I u,,), as follows. 
1. Choose a reasonable starting point for O*. We use 
the posterior  maximum  of  P(8  I  u,,), which we  estimate 
by the EM algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin 1977), 
again treating s as unobserved data. 
2. Repeat the following  steps a number  of  times:  (a) 
sample s*  from P(s  /  O  = O*, u,,) and (b) sample 8* from 
P(O  /  s  = s:"  u,,). For our data, the distribution of  sim- 
ulated values 0* appears to converge after 10 iterations. 
Increasing the  number  of  iterations  did  not  noticeably 
change the distribution of  simulated values of  8* or our 
final results. 
Iterations of  this procedure yield approximately indepen- 
dent random samples from the posterior distribution of  8. 
We found that 50 iterations provided sufficient precision. 
6.2  Averaging Over Uncertainty in y 
We can factor the conditional posterior density as fol- 
lows: Journal of the American Statistical Association, June 1990 
The first factor here is just the Normal error density from 
the model (2),  and the second factor is the Normal-mixture 
density parameterized  by  8. Their product yields  a new 
Normal-mixture density with easily calculated parameters 
4;  for each  district; we  sample from these independent 
distributions. 
For each uncontested district, we simulate y,  from the 
truncated Normal distribution (9). We combine these with 
the simulated values yi for contested districts to get a sam- 
ple vector y from its posterior distribution. 
6.3  Averaging Over  u, 
To estimate the seats-votes  curve and its variability, we 
first approximate the first two moments of the joint  con- 
ditional distribution P(V,, St  I  y, a,), for several values of 
6,. Figure 5 provides an intuitive sense of our model and 
sampling procedure by  plotting  several simulated values 
u,, for 6, = 0, as a function of observed district votes uio, 
for Ohio in 1972. Note the assumed distribution of  effec- 
tive votes for the uncontested districts. 
The aggregate votes and seats are averages [Eqs. (3)] 
of their district-level counterparts v;, and sit,  which in turn 
depend on yi and 6, only through their mean air  = y,  + 
6,. Thus the desired conditional moments can be expressed 
in terms of the following expectations: 
Some of  the foregoing integrals are immediately eval- 
uated through the standard Normal distribution function 
@;  we calculate the rest by approximating the inverse logit 
function eul(l + eu)  by a third-degree polynomial in u. 
We  now  approximate  the seats-votes  curve E(S I  V) 
versus V by the function defined by E(S,  I a,) versus E(V, 
I  a,), implicitly parameterized by a, (or, equivalently, by 
the scalar 6,). Similarly, we approximate the variance as 
follows: 
var(S, )  V,) .=  var(S,  1  a,) - cov( Vl,  Sl  I a,) 
var( V,  I  a,)  ' 
This variance depends on V,  and is parameterized by 6, in 
the foregoing expression. The formula would be exactly 
Figure 5. Simulations, Ohio, 1972. 
correct if  S, and V, were jointly Normally distributed, and 
it is a reasonable approximation for our problem. 
6.4  Calculating Summaries 
Finally, we simulate several vectors y from the posterior 
density  P(y  I  u,).  Each of  these samples determines an 
electoral system, for which we approximate the seats-votes 
curve and its variance, as described previously. From the 
seats-votes  curve, we calculate the bias and responsiveness 
of  the system between 45% and 55% [Eqs. (7)]. Finally, 
we estimate the bias and responsiveness of  the true elec- 
toral system, and our uncertainty in these quantities, with 
the sample mean and variance of  these values, over the 
many independent samples of  y. 
All computations were done in the Gauss computer lan- 
guage on an IBM PS12. 
7.  RESULTS 
The procedure described in Section 6 produces estimates 
of an electoral system from the results of a single statewide 
election. This includes estimates of  the seats-votes  curve, 
its  variability,  and  summaries such  as the  bias  and re- 
sponsiveness functions. Our model assumes that district 
votes  move  in  an approximate  uniform  manner  as the 
statewide vote totals change. Because of  the lack  of  in- 
formation, we assume the absence of  spatial correlation. 
Finally, we assume that the district votes roughly follow 
a three-hump distribution specified by our family of  prior 
distributions. Within these constraints, our model is quite 
general and fits recent legislative electoral data quite well. 
An example of the complete results appear in Figure 6. 
The solid line in  this figure is the estimated seats-votes 
curve E(S  )  V)  for Ohio in  1972. The dotted lines show 
plus and minus two standard errors of  estimation: E(S I 
V)  +-  2 var(E(S I  V,  y))ll*. Instead of  presenting seven of 
these figures for each of  three states, we summarize the Gelman and King: Estimating the  Electoral Consequences of  Legislative Redistricting 
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Figure 6. Estimated Seats-Votes  Curve, Ohio, 1972. 
results for each election from 1968 to 1980, using Formula 
(7). 
The results for all seven years in Ohio appear in Figure 
7,  where responsiveness is plotted by partisan bias. Pooled 
standard error estimates appear in  the lower left of  the 
figure. The black square marks 1968, a year of  moderate 
responsiveness but with an extreme bias favoring the Re- 
publicans. The next square is 1970, which is close to and 
within two standard errors of 1968. In 1971, the Democrats 
controlled the redistricting process, dramatically affecting 
Ohio's electoral system:  the dotted line drawn  between 
1970 and 1972, to indicate redistricting, represents a sys- 
tematic change from extreme Republican  bias  to slight 
Democratic bias-far  beyond what one would expect due 
to mere random variability. The change also appears per- 
manent, as the elections over the course of  the rest of  the 
decade remain at or above the initial level of  Democratic 
s  l  1 
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Figure 8. Connecticut House, 1968-1 980. 
bias. The other change in the figure is a noticeable trend 
after redistricting toward lower responsiveness. 
The changes in Connecticut's electoral system are por- 
trayed in Figure 8. All of  the years in  Connecticut have 
electoral systems that  are quite  responsive, particularly 
compared with Ohio. In 1968 and 1970, Connecticut had 
essentially  no  partisan  bias.  The  1971 redistricting  was 
controlled by  the Republicans, and their effect in biasing 
the system in their favor seems quite dramatic-again  much 
beyond what one would expect due to random variability. 
This dramatic effect seems ephemeral, however, since over 
the course of  the rest of  the decade the electoral system 
worked its way  back  to just  about where it  began. The 
Republican gerrymanderers in Connecticut were ob- 
viously not as successful as their Democratic counterparts 
in  Ohio. We  speculate  that  the pattern  of  incumbency 
retirements accounts for this difference-particularly  since 
the Watergate  landslide  in  1974 helped to defeat  many 
Republican state legislators. 
Figure 9 portrays Wisconsin's electoral system. Because 
a single party did not elect a governor and a majority of 
s  l 
'  -0.09  -0.06  -0'03  0.00  0.03  0  06 
R  Bios  Portison Bias  D  Bics 
Figure 7. Ohio House, 1968-1 980.  Figure 9. Wisconsin House, 1968-1 980. 282  Journal of  the American Statistical Association, June 1990 
both houses of  the state legislature, Wisconsin was redis- 
tricted by a bipartisan agreement between the parties. Re- 
districting thus has a quite predictable non-effect on the 
system: the change from 1970 to 1972 is no greater than 
most other changes between consecutive elections in this 
graph. Political scientists have speculated that bipartisan 
redistricters primarily try to protect incumbents; with fewer 
seats of  both parties vulnerable to electoral swings, this 
would decrease responsiveness (Mayhew 1971). Surpris- 
ingly, Wisconsin's responsiveness changes no more across 
redistricting than between any other two consecutive elec- 
tions. Of course, responsiveness in Wisconsin started from 
a low base; perhaps redistricters could not reduce respon- 
siveness any further due to the geographic pattern of voters 
in the state. 
When controlling the redistricting process, partisans have 
successfully biased the electoral system in their favor, at 
least in the short term. A glance at Figures 7-9  shows that 
redistricting had no systematic effect on responsiveness in 
any of  the three states. All previous seats-votes  models 
have been either deterministic, entirely theoretical, or av- 
erage over many elections.  Some have ignored partisan 
bias and either fit responsiveness or fixed it to the value 
of 3.0; other models have assumed the electoral system to 
be constant  over  several elections.  We  explicitly model 
variability and generate estimates and standard errors of 
bias  and  responsiveness for  each  statewide  election. A 
comparison of the changes between elections with the stan- 
dard errors in Figures 7-9  leads us to reject deterministic 
models and those with constant bias and responsiveness. 
[Received November 1988. Revised  September 1989.1 
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